Post-Assad Syria at Year One: Hope, Amnesia, and the High-Risk Bet on a Former Jihadist

One year after Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus, Syria stands at a crossroads that almost no policymaker in Washington—or many Syrians themselves—imagined a decade ago: a country trying to reinvent itself under a former al-Qaeda figure, backed by a U.S. administration eager to declare victory over Iran and terrorism, and ready to lift the harshest sanctions it ever imposed on Damascus.

The images of Damascus streets packed with celebrants are powerful. But beneath the flags and fireworks lies a far more complicated story: a fragile state whose institutions were built by a dictatorship, now being repurposed under a leadership with its own violent past; a population euphoric at Assad’s fall yet haunted by 170,000 forcibly disappeared; and a United States that is effectively trading accountability and human-rights leverage for short-term geopolitical gains.

To understand the stakes, you have to see this moment not as a clean break, but as the latest chapter in a 50-year cycle of authoritarianism, foreign intervention, and transactional Western policy in Syria.

The bigger picture: From Assad dynasty to jihadist-turned-president

Syrians have now lived through three era-defining transitions in just over half a century:

• 1970–2011 – The Assad state: Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970 and the subsequent Ba’athist police state created a system built on pervasive intelligence services, sectarian manipulation, and ruthless repression—most infamously the 1982 Hama massacre against the Muslim Brotherhood.
• 2011–2024 – Uprising, war, fragmentation: The 2011 uprising against Bashar al-Assad devolved into a brutal multi-sided war involving the regime, Iran, Russia, ISIS, al-Qaeda affiliates, Kurdish forces, and foreign-backed rebels. By conservative estimates, over 500,000 people were killed and millions displaced.
• 2024–2025 – The collapse of Assad and the “Jolani turn”: A lightning offensive by rebel forces, compounded by Russian fatigue, Iranian overstretch, and internal regime decay, finally drove Assad from Damascus. Into that vacuum stepped Ahmed al-Sharaa—better known for years as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the former leader of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate and later of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

To many Western policymakers, Jolani’s transformation—from jihadist commander to suit-and-tie political figurehead—has been framed as a pragmatic evolution. U.S. officials formally revoked the terrorist designation of HTS in July and are now presenting al-Sharaa as a stabilizing partner, pointing to his participation in a coalition against ISIS and moves to remove other extremist networks like Hezbollah and al-Qaeda remnants.

The core gamble is clear: a former insurgent with deep local legitimacy and military control can stabilize Syria faster and more effectively than exiled technocrats or fragmented opposition coalitions ever could. That is the same logic that underpinned past U.S. partnerships with problematic strongmen in the region. The difference is that this time, the prior affiliation was not just authoritarian—but explicitly jihadist.

Why the Caesar Act matters—and what its repeal really signals

The move to roll back the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act through the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act is being sold as a liberation of the Syrian economy from collective punishment. For many Syrians, collapsing currency, soaring food prices, and blocked reconstruction have been daily realities. Sanctions didn’t cause all of that—Assad’s war economy and systemic corruption did—but they unquestionably amplified the pain.

The Caesar Act was designed for three main purposes:

• To deter reconstruction funding that might entrench Assad.
• To raise the cost for Russia, Iran, and others doing business with the regime.
• To signal moral condemnation of torture and mass atrocities documented in the “Caesar” photos smuggled out by a regime defector.

Its repeal now sends an equally powerful but very different signal: Washington is prepared to trade away one of its last leverage tools not only against Assad but against Syrian state actors more broadly, in exchange for geopolitical realignment. Critics of Caesar always argued it hurt civilians more than elites; supporters argued it was the only meaningful pressure point left. Lifting it at the moment of political transition risks collapsing that argument into something even more uncomfortable:

If enough geopolitical boxes are checked—countering Iran, partnering against ISIS, engaging Israel—then even the world’s most graphic documentation of torture and mass killing can be effectively bracketed as “past issues” to be addressed later.

Justice versus stability: The disappeared as the unresolved core of the conflict

The Syrian Network for Human Rights reports more than 170,000 people remain forcibly disappeared between March 2011 and August 2025, the overwhelming majority in former regime detention centers. That number is not just a statistic—it is an indictment. It also represents the single largest obstacle to real reconciliation.

Families want three basic things: the truth about what happened, the return of remains if their relatives are dead, and some form of justice—whether criminal accountability or serious reparations. None of these demands disappear with Assad on a Moscow balcony instead of a Damascus palace.

Al-Sharaa’s government has made a highly choreographed move: televised trials of more than a dozen security force members accused of extrajudicial killings, illegal detention, and torture. Former U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford rightly notes that if these trials are genuine and result in real accountability, they would be remarkable—particularly under a president with a militant past.

But the question is scale. A dozen officers on trial against a backdrop of tens of thousands of disappeared can look less like systemic justice and more like selective, symbolic sacrifice. Without:

• an independent investigative mechanism,
• a national registry and truth process for the disappeared, and
• a clear pathway for victims’ participation and reparations,

the new justice project risks becoming what many Syrians have seen before: performative accountability designed to legitimize a new order, not transform it.

The pragmatic rehabilitation of a former jihadist

One of the most under-examined elements in mainstream coverage is the moral and strategic precedent being set by elevating al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda-aligned commander, to the presidency with American blessing.

There are historical parallels:

• Former insurgents in Northern Ireland transitioned into politics via the Good Friday Agreement.
• Members of armed movements like the ANC in South Africa or the PLO in Palestine moved from armed struggle to political leadership.

But there are also crucial differences. In most of those cases, there was a negotiated settlement framework, international oversight, and a relatively clear ideological evolution away from indiscriminate violence. Syria has, at best, a hurried, security-driven realignment: the U.S. pulls its terrorist designation, Trump hosts al-Sharaa at the White House, and Washington emphasizes counter-ISIS cooperation while downplaying his jihadist past.

For jihadist movements globally, this creates a dangerous potential lesson: if you rebrand effectively, distance yourself from transnational terror, and become useful to a major power’s regional strategy, political rehabilitation—even to the level of a presidency—is possible. That does not mean every group can or will pull it off, but it alters the perceived cost-benefit calculus.

Iran, Israel, and the regional chessboard

The shift in Washington’s Syria policy is ultimately less about Syria’s internal transformation than about regional balance.

From a U.S. strategic perspective, the al-Sharaa government offers several attractive features:

• Breaking Syria out of Tehran’s orbit: A Syria no longer aligned with Iran and Hezbollah weakens the so-called “Axis of Resistance” stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean.
• Creating a buffer for Israel: If Damascus cooperates (or at least coordinates) with Israel regarding southern Syria, it potentially reduces the risk of Iranian-backed militias operating near the Golan Heights.
• Maintaining a counter-ISIS platform: Even a reduced U.S. military footprint requires local partners; an aligned Syrian government offers that without the political baggage of partnering with Kurdish forces alone.

Trump’s public insistence that Israel maintain a “strong and true dialogue” with Damascus reflects a broader strategic play: integrate Syria, or at least de-escalate it, into a network of understandings that resemble an expanded Abraham Accords architecture. A Syria that expels Hezbollah and collaborates against ISIS is far more palatable to Israel’s security establishment than one that remains a forward operating base for Iran.

The risk is that this regional calculus sidelines Syrians’ core demands for justice and political pluralism—once again turning Syria into an arena for others’ security concerns rather than a place where citizens’ rights are central.

Sectarian fault lines: Sweida as a warning, not an anomaly

This past year’s sectarian clashes in Sweida—pitting Druze militias, Sunni Bedouin tribes, and government forces—are a stark reminder that Assad’s departure did not erase the social fractures he exploited for decades.

The Assad regime cultivated a political economy of fear and patronage that was deeply sectarian, even as it wrapped itself in “secular” slogans. Removing the regime does not automatically remove the fear, the weapons, or the warlords. It can, in fact, unleash them.

Without a serious plan for:

• demobilizing militias,
• integrating fighters into national institutions,
• and building inclusive local governance,

Syria risks replicating the post-2003 Iraqi scenario: a central government aligned with Washington but hollowed out by militia power, regional interference, and cycles of communal revenge.

The economic gamble: lifting sanctions without structural reform

Many Syrians understandably see the repeal of Caesar as a lifeline: the chance for foreign investment, reconstruction financing, and a slow normalization of economic life after years of collapse. But lifting sanctions is not the same as building an economy.

Three questions will determine whether this shift delivers real benefits:

• Who controls reconstruction contracts? If they fall to a narrow circle of ex-HTS-aligned business networks or recycled regime-era oligarchs, inequality and resentment will deepen.
• Will there be transparency and anti-corruption mechanisms? Post-war reconstruction globally—from Bosnia to Iraq—shows that without oversight, reconstruction can entrench kleptocracy.
• How quickly will ordinary Syrians feel change? Delayed or uneven benefits risk fueling disillusionment with the new leadership, particularly in areas that bore the brunt of regime bombardment.

There is a narrow window in which visible economic improvement can cement al-Sharaa’s domestic legitimacy. Failure to deliver will empower spoilers, including remnants of ISIS and other militant groups looking to exploit grievances.

What mainstream coverage is missing

Much reporting understandably focuses on the drama of Assad’s fall, Trump’s meetings with al-Sharaa, and the spectacle of Damascus crowds celebrating. Less attention is being paid to three critical blind spots:

1. The institutional legacy of the Assad state: The same security services that ran torture prisons are now partially repurposed under al-Sharaa. Unless there is systemic vetting and reform, the architecture of repression remains.
2. The absence of a clearly articulated political roadmap: There is talk of liberation and new beginnings, but little concrete detail on elections, constitutional reform, or power-sharing with Syria’s diverse communities, including Kurds and political opposition outside HTS’s orbit.
3. The precedent for international justice: How the world handles Assad—now sheltered in Russia—and his inner circle will reverberate far beyond Syria. If a leader can oversee mass atrocities and simply retire abroad with minimal legal consequence, the deterrent effect of international law is further eroded.

Looking ahead: What to watch in the next 12–24 months

Several indicators will reveal whether this “new era” in U.S.–Syria relations represents a genuine transformation or just a rebranded version of old patterns:

• Depth and breadth of accountability: Do prosecutions expand up the chain of command and beyond a handful of low- to mid-level officers? Is there movement on truth mechanisms for the disappeared?
• Political opening: Does al-Sharaa’s government allow independent media, credible opposition parties, and genuine civil-society organizing—or does it tighten the space under a new ideological banner?
• Security sector reform: Are notorious intelligence branches dismantled or reformed? Are detainees released in large numbers with transparent procedures?
• Regional posture: Does Syria truly distance itself from Iran and Hezbollah, and how does that reshape the Lebanese and Iraqi theatres where those actors are deeply embedded?
• Israeli–Syrian dynamics: Do ground incursions and airstrikes in southern Syria decrease, and is any quiet security coordination formalized?

For now, Syrians are allowed a moment of celebration. Half a century of Assad rule has ended, and the architecture of fear has at least been shaken. But behind the political theater in Washington and the victory speeches in Damascus lies the harder work: building a state that is not just post-Assad, but post-impunity.

The real test of this “new era” will not be the number of high-level visits or the pace of sanctions relief—it will be whether the mothers of the disappeared, the residents of destroyed neighborhoods, and the minorities caught in the crossfire of sectarian clashes feel they have gained a voice, rights, and a future they can shape themselves.